This paper empirically analyses the determinants of ¢rm participation in Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). A review of the theoretical literature highlights the di¤culty of identifying testable hypotheses. Using a large database of European RJVs, we estimate a participation equation at the ¢rm level using the logit procedure. We ¢nd that sectorial R&D intensity, industry concentration, ¢rm size, technological spillovers, and past RJV participation positively in£uence the probability of forming RJVs. By contrast, patents' e¡ectiveness reduce the likelihood of RJV formation. Last, country ¢xed e¡ects suggest that ¢rms from larger countries are less likely to participate in cross-border RJVs.
Towlinsky [1999] ). Third, the research paths (complementary versus substitute R&D) a¡ect the incentives to form an RJV (Katsoulacos and Ulph [1998] ). Finally, all these models show that strategic interactions in the product market a¡ect the decision to participate in RJVs. This e¡ect may be direct (depending on the degree of product market complementarity) or indirect (e.g. when RJVs are simply used as a vehicle to enhance the feasibility of product market collusion).
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The business literature provides additional and useful information regarding RJV formation. It stresses that ¢rms have di¡erent`absorptive capacities' of research results, which in turn determine their willingness to form RJVs. The absorptive capacity of each ¢rm is determined by factors such as size, past experience with research cooperation, corporate culture and business line of activity (Kogut [1991] ).
Last, speci¢c public policies towards RJVs have been developed. On the one side, competition law determines the nature of inter-¢rm cooperation that is legally accepted. On the other side, subsidies are sometimes granted to encourage RJV creation, as these arrangements are believed to have some socially bene¢cial characteristics, such as the reduction in the duplication of R&D costs.
Given the complexity of the problem, empirical research has been hampered by a two-fold constraint: lack of micro data, and the unobservability of a number of key parameters highlighted by theoretical models, such as the level of technological spillovers or di¡erences in absorptive capacity across ¢rms. As a result, the empirical literature using a structural approach is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, the only contribution that overcomes some of these problems is that of RÎller, Tombak and Siebert [1998] . They develop a duopoly model that contains four ingredients: spillovers, R&D cost sharing, ¢rm asymmetries and product market complementarities. They show that size symmetry and product complementarity between ¢rms enhance the likelihood of RJV formation. Note that their analysis focuses on the formation of pairs between ¢rms that are known to have created an RJV. Thus, the question they ask is: given that a ¢rm has decided positively on participation, which partners does it choose? However, they do not address the issue of which ¢rms are more likely to decide on embarking in an RJV in the ¢rst place.
In this paper we attempt to ¢ll the gap between theory and empirical testing by making use of a large ¢rm level data-set. The data pertains to RJVs formed under the umbrella of the Eureka and EU Framework Programmes, both pan-European initiatives aimed at enhancing inter-¢rm research cooperation. As a control group, we consider a much larger sample of ¢rms that could potentially participate in these RJVs. Thus, we are able to measure the e¡ect of the relevant ¢rm and industry characteristics that in£uence RJV formation. We use the logit estimation procedure as we can observe if the ¢rms under analysis decide or not to form an RJV in a given period, but not their pro¢ts under these two alternative scenarios.
We ¢nd that sectorial R&D intensity, industry concentration, ¢rm size, technological spillovers, and past RJV participation positively in£uence the probability of forming RJVs. By contrast, patents' e¡ectiveness reduce the likelihood of RJV formation. Last, country ¢xed e¡ects suggest that ¢rms from larger countries are less likely to participate in cross-border RJVs.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the data and how the variables are constructed and presents the empirical speci¢cation, while Section III presents the econometric results.
ii. data, variable construction and econometric specification
II(i). The Data
The set of RJVs which are analysed in this paper are retrieved from thè STEP to RJV' database, constructed as part of an EU ¢nanced TSER project. These RJVs have been formed under the umbrella of either the Eureka Programme or the EU Framework Programme for Science and Technology (EU-FP in the remainder of the paper). Eureka was launched in the mid-eighties as a pan-European initiative aimed at enhancing cross-border technological cooperation. Obtaining the Eureka label does not entitle ¢rms to EU subsidies, nor is Eureka an EU programme. However, obtaining the Eureka`seal of approval' enhances ¢rms' ability to receive subsidies from their respective national authorities. RJVs formed under EU-FP programmes are eligible for a subsidy, which varies according to the nature of the project. Information on these projects has been retrieved from CORDIS (an EU database which centralises information on all EU ¢nanced projects in a raw format), and the Eureka web page. Both programmes require participants to establish transnational projects (i.e. RJVs involving ¢rms from only one country are not eligible).
Our data set is constructed using three separate sources. First, we use data on individual Eureka and EU-FP RJVs. In both cases, we have a brief description of the project, a sectorial acronym, and the name of the participating ¢rms. Some projects were launched in the mid eighties, but determinants of research joint venture formationthe bulk of them were initiated in the nineties. We have data on RJVs until 1996.
2 Table I depicts the total number of projects involving a ¢rm from a given country, the geographical origin of ¢rms participating in RJVs, and the average number and percentage of ¢rms of the same nationality participating in a given project. The data pertains to projects covering the period 1986^1996.
There is a high correlation between number of projects, average number and percentage of participants of the same nationality, and country size. This should come as no surprise; nonetheless, some interesting patterns emerge. For instance, while German and French ¢rms appear keen to participate in EU-FP projects, many of these cooperations involve compatriot ¢rms. This tendency is even more marked for Eureka, since the ¢gure is larger for Eureka than EU-FP for almost all countries. This may be taken as an indication that despite the programmes' declared objective of fostering pan-European cooperation, many of the projects are still predominantly national. Firms of non-EU origin tend to be keener to participate in Eureka. This is the case of Norway, Switzerland, Poland, Sweden, and Finland (the latter two countries were still not part of the EU). Last, the average size of EU-FP projects is larger (7.15 ¢rms per project) compared to Eureka projects (5.89 ¢rms).
Throughout the construction of the sample, we used a four-digit sectorial breakdown. It would have been preferable to work at eight digits, but some of the data were not available at such a ¢ne level of aggregation. The nomenclature used is that of the British Central Statistical O¤ce (CSO).
A word is in order on the composition of these RJVs. While some RJVs in our sample are clearly vertical (involving business units in di¡erent sectors), most of them involve at least two ¢rms operating in the same market segment. Table II provides the sectorial a¤liation of participating ¢rms. As can be readily seen, ¢rms belonging to the information technology and aerospace clusters represent the most important contingent. This is followed by environmental and energy technologies. Table III provides information on the number of participants by project. In the case of EU-FP projects, the distribution is fairly even, with a peak for projects containing four to seven participants. By contrast, Eureka projects involve, on average, fewer participants. 
determinants of research joint venture formation
The second source of information pertains to participating ¢rms. We retrieved this data from Amadeus, a database produced by Bureau Van Dijk, a specialist provider of ¢rm-level data based on balance sheet information. In the version of the database that we used, the total number of entries exceeds 200,000 ¢rms, with detailed information on ownership structure, and a ¢ne sectorial a¤liation (up to 8 digits). Geographical coverage pertains to Europe (including Central and Eastern Europe). To our knowledge, Amadeus is the most comprehensive source of ¢rm level data in Europe. Since its launch, this database has been used quite extensively in academic circles (see for instance, Filer and Hanousek [2002] for an overview, or Bureau van Dijk's web page, www.bvdny.com).
We retrieved the relevant information on ¢rms that appear both in Amadeus and in our RJV database, and dropped ¢rms which had formed EU-FP or Eureka RJVs, but for which no data was available in Amadeus. We retrieved unconsolidated balance sheets in order to make use of data pertaining to the relevant business establishment. We have been extremely careful in identifying the relevant business unit, as many conglomerates participate in these RJVs. 3 Given that information on business units and industry characteristics only span the period 1991^1996, and that some of the independent variables may be endogenous to the model, we construct our dependent variable for the period 1995^96. 4 This allows us to deal with possible issues of endogeneity by using lagged values for the independent variables (i.e. pre-1995 values). The sample of ¢rms that had formed an EU-FP or Eureka RJV during the period 1995^1996 yields a total of 1222 observations. We could gather the relevant ¢rm and industry level variables for 798 of them, and thus dropped the remaining 424 observations.
As mentioned above, it is necessary to form a control group with ¢rms that have not joined an RJV during the period under study. We assume that Amadeus is a fair representation of the true universe, and use the entire Amadeus database as a control group. In some cases, entries in Amadeus are incomplete, and variables are sometimes missing (e.g., number of employees). The sample for which we could gather all the relevant information yields a total of 54610 observations (of which 798 have formed one or more EU-FP or Eureka RJV during the period 1995^96).
The third source of information we use is the Worldscope database. The latter provides R&D expenditures for about 1500 large ¢rms. The data is available for the period 1991^1996 at the SIC four digit level of aggregation, which we converted into their CSO equivalent using detailed conversion tables. This allowed us to construct R&D intensity at the four digit level.
II(ii). Variables and Econometric Speci¢cation
We need to construct a set of variables that measure or proxy the determinants of RJV formation identi¢ed in the theoretical models, and explicitly spell out testable hypotheses. More precisely, we need measures pertaining to ¢rm size, concentration, industry R&D intensity, and industry speci¢c proxies for the extent of spillovers and the e¡ectiveness of intellectual property rights protection. In addition, for some ¢rms, willingness to join an RJV may be in£uenced by past experience with RJVs. This may re£ect the success or failure of past ventures, the existence 3 The presence of large, multi-product ¢rms, poses a problem. Suppose that ABB participates in an RJV in semi-conductors. The relevant business units are the ABB subsidiaries that appear with this product as their main business line at the four-digit level. The consolidated, worldwide accounts of the ABB group would be inappropriate here. 4 Throughout the remainder of the text, one period refers to two years.
of once-for-all ¢xed costs associated with RJV formation, as well as a learning process in achieving successful cooperation. Last, the origin of ¢rms may introduce a country speci¢c e¡ect. Indeed, it seems that national idiosyncracies in£uence the attitude of ¢rms towards formal cooperation (Nelson [1993] ).
To construct the variables, we take four digit sectors and Europe as representing the relevant market. The variables that we include in the regressions are as follows:
To control for di¡erences in the extent and magnitude of potential cost reductions across industries, we include R&D intensity at the level of the industry, calculated as total R&D expenditures over total sales, reported by ¢rms belonging to that four-digit sector. We retrieved this data from Worldscope, and we call this variable RDI. All else equal, costs reductions resulting from a successful RJV will be more important in R&D intensive industries, thus a¡ecting ¢rms' incentives to join in the ¢rst place. This cost reduction e¡ects should positively in£uence ¢rms' willingness to form an RJV.
To measure di¡erences in the importance of spillovers across industries, we constructed two proxies. The ¢rst is based on data taken from Mans¢eld [1985] which measures the speed at which innovationsöunwillinglyödi¡use within an industry. It refers to both product and process innovation and is measured as the average number of months before the di¡usion of an innovation in the industry. The information is available at two to four digits, depending on the industry. We assigned values for this variable accordingly (for instance, in some sectors, we have a perfect correspondence; in others, we assigned the value associated to the higher level of aggregation for which the spillover variable was available). This variable acts as a proxy for thè spillover lag', and we label it SPL. Another concurrent interpretation pertaining to this variable is that it re£ects the importance of lead time in R&D intensive industries. We expect this variable to appear with a negative sign, since a slow di¡usion of innovations within an industry is indicative of limited spillovers. The drawback is that data is only available for industries that undertake R&D on a signi¢cant scale. Our sample also contains ¢rms belonging to sectors not included in Mans¢eld's sample. For the sectors for which no data is available, we have assigned the average value of the spillover lag variable. 5 5 We also estimated our equations excluding the industries for which no data is available, and the value and signi¢cance of the coe¤cient associated to SPL barely changed. With the entire sample, we also included a dummy equal to one for industries for which no spillover information is available, and zero otherwise. The dummy proved not signi¢cant, and the other coe¤cients were not a¡ected by this inclusion. Last, we estimated our regressions excluding SPL and the results remained identical for the remaining variables. All of the above indicates that our results are not driven by this coding choice. See the Journal's website for these regressions.
The second proxy is built using the data reported by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter [1987] that measures the e¡ectiveness of patents in eighteen industrial sectors (both product and process). We expect`patent e¡ectiveness' (denoted PATEF ) to appear with a negative sign, as ¢rms that operate in sectors where patents are e¡ective do not need to rely on RJVs in order to internalise spillovers. E¡ective patents ensure that innovators can successfully protect their intellectual property rights, thus driving unintended leakages (spillovers) to zero. As is the case with the data reported by Mans¢eld [1985] , there are some sectors for which this particular variable is not available. We adopted the strategy described above, and assigned the average value of this variable to sectors for which data is missing.
6 Note that, while both these proxies (SPL and PATEF ) are related to spillovers, the original sources of information are quite distinct.
In the case of an asymmetric oligopoly, internalisation of spillovers via RJV formation is greater the smaller the number of rivals in that industry segment. In order to measure market concentration, we constructed the Hirschman-Her¢ndÌhl index (HHI ) for each four-digit sector present in our sample. The value taken by the HHI is the average for the 1991^94 period. Note that this variable also generates information as to whether ¢rms join RJVs to reduce the toughness of actual or potential competition. Both the spillover and market power motives predict a positive coe¤cient on this variable.
To represent asymmetries across ¢rms, we introduce a measure of ¢rm size, namely the natural logarithm of the number of employees for each ¢rm in our sample, that we denote logFS. This measure is fairly stable over time. We have taken ¢rm level averages for the 1991^94 period. According to most oligopoly models for homogeneous products, size di¡erences within an industry re£ect di¡erential e¤ciency.
7 Also, if there are ¢xed costs associated with forming RJVs (such as paper work and/or the establishment of speci¢c facilities), large ¢rms may be more willing to join, as they can spread these costs across a larger volume of sales. In addition, size is likely to be highly correlated with`absorptive capacity', thus increasing the likelihood to join. Last, it may be the case that size may in£uence the public authority responsible for these programmes. This may possibly result from exogenous preferences`for' or`against' big business, or a process of regulatory capture. An alternative measure of 6 The comment made in the previous footnote regarding SPL also apply for PATEF, i.e. the results are not sensitive to this coding choice.
7 Most RJV models represent competition in the third stage of the game as quantity Cournot competition. One of the basic results of the Cournot model is that ¢rms' market share within the industry is inversely related to their marginal costs, i.e. directly related to their e¤ciency. asymmetries is market share (denoted MS ), calculated as ¢rm over industry size, both measured by the number of employees.
Practitioners and the business literature stress that some ¢rms are keener to cooperate than others as a result of di¡erences such as corporate culture. It is also stressed that experience or past participation in RJVs may make it easier to repeat the experience (with the same group of ¢rms, or new partners). We have thus constructed`quantitative' variables that take into account the cumulated number of past participations in Eureka and the EU Framework Programme for the period 1986^92, and label these variables EXP-FP and EXP-EU. These variables also provides information on the success of these programmes (in terms of ¢rms' willingness to take part in them). We also include a set of dummies for the country of origin of the ¢rm. The data will itself reveal whether geographic origin is an important determinant behind the decision to form a project.
Last, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the business unit has participated in at least one EU-FP or Eureka RJV initiated during the period 1995^96, and 0 otherwise. Table IV reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables that we used in the estimation.
The expression to be estimated can be written as:
where FX is the logistic cumulative distributive function. The sub-indices iY jY t and k, respectively denote ¢rm, sector, time, and country. We have lagged our independent variables by two periods in order to mitigate the endogeneity problem from our estimation. Since the residuals are likely to be correlated within the industries, and especially given the industry level variables (Moulton [1990] ), our calculation of standard errors controls for this correlation by clustering at the four-digit level.
iii. econometric results Table V presents the results of estimating alternative speci¢cations for expression 1 using the logit estimation technique and controlling for residual correlation among observations from the same industry. The estimation contains industry variables (R&D intensity, the spillover lag and concentration), and ¢rms speci¢c variables (size and past participation in Eureka and EU-FP projects). In Table V , we present the results pertaining to six distinct speci¢cations. The purpose of this exercise is to assess whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion of speci¢c variables. Last, in some regressions we include country dummies whose point estimates are presented in Table VI . The Netherlands were chosen as the reference country. determinants of research joint venture formation Note: These two columns correspond to regressions (5) and (6) in Table 5 . The Netherlands is the omitted country. t-statistics in absolute values in parentheses.
As expected, sectorial R&D intensity (RDI ) appears with a positive sign, and it is signi¢cant at less than the 1% level. This re£ects the fact that an RJV is an attractive option for projects involving large R&D outlays because of the cost sharing element.
The point estimate associated with the spillover lag (SPL) is also signi¢cant at the 1% or 5% levels, depending on the speci¢cation. This indicates that RJVs are more likely to materialise in sectors where technological knowledge di¡uses fast. The variable measuring patent e¡ectiveness (PATEF; also signi¢cant at the 1% or 5% levels) con¢rms this ¢nding: when intellectual property rights are successfully protected by patents, ¢rms have less of an incentive to engage in RJVs. As mentioned previously, both variables are related to spillovers, but they each act as proxies for quite distinct economic phenomena. The fact that both are signi¢cant serves to emphasise that knowledge di¡usion is central to our understanding of RJV formation. 8 An industry's HHI re£ects the degree of concentration, or conversely, the extent of fragmentation. The less fragmented is an industry, the easier it is to identify the appropriate partners to form an RJV. In addition, a more concentrated industry o¡ers greater scope for e¡ective internalisation of spillovers. The coe¤cient is positive and signi¢cant (at the 10% level or less in most speci¢cations), lending support to the arguments presented above. Note that while the variables SPL and PATEF act as proxies for the presence of spillovers at the industry level, concentration captures the potential for internalising them within an RJV.
The coe¤cient for the variable measuring ¢rm size (logFS ) is positive and highly signi¢cant (well below the 1% level). There is a number of (non-exclusive) explanations for this ¢nding. First, it may re£ect the fact that, given the degree of concentration, large ¢rms prefer to form RJVs with other large ¢rms to maximise spillover internalisation. RÎller et al.
[1998] provide theoretical results pointing in that direction. Second, this may be an indication of signi¢cant ¢xed costs associated with RJV formation, such as the establishment of speci¢c facilities (e.g. a new R&D lab), or the administrative and negotiation e¡orts necessary to reach agreement with partners and/or sponsoring organisations. Third, large ¢rms in an industry will have a strong incentive to participate in many RJVs in order to monitor innovative activity in their segment (a sophisticated form of`technology watch').
9 Fourth, for inter-industry RJVs (that is, RJVs which involve technological complementarity), ¢rms will be keen to cooperate with the largestöand more e¤cientö¢rms in the complementary industry. Last, the positive coe¤cient associated with this variable may re£ect an exogenous preference for`big business' on the part of the sponsoring organisation, or a process of regulatory capture.
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As for market share (MS ), this variable is not signi¢cant, except when ¢rm size is excluded from the speci¢cation (see columns (1) and (3) of Table V ). This simply re£ects the fact that these two variables measure pretty much the same thing: a ¢rm's absolute size versus its relative size. We opted to maintain ¢rm size and drop market share for two reasons. First, logFS turned to be systematically more signi¢cant than MS when these variables were entered on their own (and not in tandem). More importantly, absolute size not only re£ects a ¢rm's position relative to its competitors, but also indicates whether it is better placed to support the ¢xed outlays associated with the creation of an RJV.
The coe¤cients capturing past participations in Eureka or EU-FP projects (EXP-FP and EXP-EU ) are signi¢cant at less than the 1% level in both cases. There are two non-exclusive explanations for this ¢nding. First, it may re£ect the fact that a large part of the ¢xed costs associated with RJV formation have to be paid only once. Thus, having already incurred these costs, ¢rms' marginal cost of launching a new venture may very well be negligible. Second, the positive sign may be an indication that there is an important learning process in achieving successful cooperation. In addition, there is also the possibility that these variables capture the e¡ect of unobserved determinants of RJV participation.
Table VI presents point estimates for the coe¤cients on the country dummies. These estimates suggest that ¢rms originating in the larger EU countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy, and to a lesser extent, Spain) are less likely to participate in pan-European RJVs. This re£ects the fact that large country ¢rms ¢nd it easier to ¢nd RJV partners within their own borders. The other country dummy that is signi¢cantly negative is the Polish one. Apart from country size, the lower propensity of Polish ¢rms to participate in pan-European RJVs probably results from the relativè isolation' of the Polish economy during the time period studied in this paper. Three dummies are positive and`almost' signi¢cant (Finland, Greece and Denmark), and all three relate to small countries, thus mirroring the e¡ect identi¢ed above for the bigger economies.
Overall, the ¢t of the regressions is good, with a log-likelihood ratio that is signi¢cant well below the 1% level, irrespective of the speci¢cation. The pseudo-R 2 are also satisfactory, reaching 0.34 in the most complete speci¢cation.
The policy implications of these ¢ndings can be summarised as follows.
